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Freedom of Religion in Context 
Guy Haarscher∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The title of this article is a paradox in itself. Freedom of religion 
is a part of human rights law. The basic assumption of human rights 
law is that human rights are universal and that respect for human 
rights should not depend on any particular economic, political, or 
cultural context. Indeed, if basic liberties were dependent upon their 
appropriateness to the norms of a particular country, group, or 
community, they would unavoidably lose their critical content. If 
every group producing specific, context-related norms were entitled 
to tailor human rights to its own needs and values, Muslim women 
would not be able to fight the discriminations they endure in their 
countries, and it would be impossible to condemn genital mutila-
tions, which are justified in the name of cultural specificities. How-
ever, many countries do impose an official religion, and the eco-
nomic or political context of the country is often an excuse to deny 
human rights in general. Thus putting freedom of religion “in con-
text” might be considered dangerous, but such a view would be a 
misunderstanding.  
II. TWO KINDS OF CONTEXTUALIZATION 
To understand human rights and cultural contexts, one should 
distinguish between two very different methods of relating human 
rights to cultural contexts (not to mention the political and eco-
nomical ones). 
The first method—the “bad” type—is the one summarized 
above: adapting basic liberties to a certain context would mean that 
when a conflict of norms arises, the particular cultural value will pre-
vail. In these circumstances, the relevant communities will only ac-
cept the segment of human rights law that fits into their own norma-
 
 ∗ Professor, Free University of Brussels (ULB); Duke University. 
HAAR-FIN.DOC 6/6/02  10:20 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
270 
tive system. That is, they would retain their prejudices, not allowing 
the universal norm of human rights to prevail over their own specific 
values. This selective “reception” of human rights by a culture would 
simply mean subordinating human rights to the values of the group. 
The latter norms would be immune to any moral criticism expressed 
from “outside” the culture. This kind of universal claim (for in-
stance, the universal requirement that religion is a matter of con-
science, not of force) would unavoidably be labelled ethnocentric. In-
stead of seeing basic human rights norms as impartial and 
transcultural standards, the (often self-appointed) leaders of the 
group would simply dismiss these external norms as the requirements 
of another particular culture, that is, Western culture. 
Such a claim should be patiently rebutted. If this is not carefully 
done, human rights will lose their critical edge and become an in-
nocuous part of cultures that will remain “sovereign” as far as the 
values they want to impose (that is, very often, the way they treat 
their own members) are concerned. 
But there is a second method—the “good” type—of considering 
human rights in a particular context. This view takes into account 
the fact that several conceptions of basic liberties exist in democratic 
countries. Consequently, it would be an oversimplification to con-
sider one of these interpretations as authentic and the others not. In 
fact, the meaning of human rights is the subject of an ongoing de-
bate. Such a controversy is normal in open societies particularly due 
to the fact that the universal norm of human rights is much more 
complex than it first appears. For instance, the status of religion itself 
is different in the United States than in many European countries. Of 
course, this is an oversimplification of the problem. There are diver-
gent currents of thought everywhere, and the debate takes place as 
much within the broad cultural contexts (United States, Western 
Europe, Eastern Europe—where the Orthodox Church is dominant, 
etc.) as between systems. 
I would like to briefly emphasize some of the very problematic 
elements of this debate. In doing so, I hope to clarify some of the 
complex contemporary stakes of freedom of religion. Although such 
an analysis will not produce general agreement, a “systematic study 
of confused notions”1 may help to create a clearer view of the dis-
 
 1. “On peut en tirer la conclusion, qui pourrait paraître irrévérencieuse, que l’objet 
propre de la philosophie est l’étude systématique des notions confuses.” Chaïm Perelman, De 
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agreements because an intelligible opposition of perspectives is better 
for democracy than sheer confusion. Additionally, although com-
plete agreement may be difficult to achieve, one must not a priori 
exclude the possibility of obtaining even a partial agreement. 
III. THE FIRST INTERPRETATION OF SECULARIZATION 
A common core of values underpins freedom of religion in both 
the United States and Western Europe. To begin with, secularization 
is a good thing only if correctly interpreted. The first interpretation 
of secularization holds that the state should not favor or discriminate 
against any religious denomination. In other words, a person’s con-
ception of the sacred or the divine should not affect his or her posi-
tion when dealing with state representatives or when acting in soci-
ety. This idea is encompassed in laïcité, a French word meaning that 
the state should work for the people (laos in Greek) as a whole, for 
the general interest of the people and not in favor of (or against) any 
subgroup or individual because of their religious conceptions. Under 
this view, the state’s responsibility lies only with secular matters—
problems related to the terrestrial life of people—and not in matters 
of faith. So there is a shared conventional wisdom on both sides of 
the Atlantic that religion should not be imposed on people and that 
the policy of compelle intrare2 must be strictly condemned. But 
laïcité requires more than mere secularization. Even under a gov-
ernment that guarantees freedom of conscience and that does not 
impose restraints on believers of any denomination (provided they 
respect each other and obey secular laws), the state may still prefer 
one of the free religions. The result is, in the most general meaning 
of the term, an established religion with freedom of conscience. 
A. Two Strategies Linked to the “Good” Secularization Process 
Two strategies can affect freedom of conscience. First, a state 
may adopt a separatist policy. Second, a state may realize neutrality 
 
la Justice, in ETHIQUE  ET DROIT 17 (Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles ed. 1990). 
 2. Compelle intrare is the policy of forcing people to enter the church. See Luke 14:23 
(King James) (“And the lord said unto the servant, Go out into the highways and hedges, and 
compel them to come in, that my house may be filled.”); SERMONS: THE WORKS OF SAINT 
AUGUSTINE 152 (John E. Rotelle ed., 1992) (“The outer constraint will create the good will 
inside.”). 
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without using separation as a tool.3 This section will discuss these 
approaches in turn. 
Separatism advocates that the political sphere should stand out-
side the realm of religions and creeds, so that the state does not ad-
vantage or disadvantage the members of any religious group. This 
philosophy is evident in the famous 1905 French statute on the 
“Separation of Church and State”4 as well as the equally well-known 
Jeffersonian wall theory.5 
Another possibility exists for respecting the freedom of con-
science and nonestablished religion standards. This strategy suggests 
that the state is authorized to aid (and subsidize) religions, provided 
it does so in an equitable manner without advantaging a particular 
religious group (and thereby establishing a state religion).6 In this 
way, a state attains neutrality without implementing separatist poli-
cies. Paradoxically, the separatist principle is more entrenched in the 
United States than in Europe. 
B. Secular and Religious Neutrality in France: A Brief Look 
Church and state overlap in several European Union countries. 
For instance, in Germany no real separation of the domains of the 
churches and federated entities (Länder) exists.7 Likewise in Greece, 
the dominant Orthodox Church intervenes in many aspects of secu-
lar life.8 The Anglican Church is stricto sensu established in England 
 
 3. Neutrality is the generally recognized standard that the state should neither impose 
nor favor a church. Separation is a particular means to obtain neutrality: if the state does not 
interfere at all in the sphere of religion, it will not be able to impose or favor any of them. Both 
states exist in Europe. 
 4. “Loi de séparation des Eglises et de l’Etat.” See J. Boussinesq, La Laïcité Française, 
in POINTS-ESSAIS (Editions du Seuil ed., 1994). 
 5. Thomas Jefferson voiced this theory in “his reply to an address to him by a commit-
tee of the Danbury Baptist Association.” The wall theory suggests that a wall of separation 
must be built between the domains of church and state: “I contemplate with sovereign rever-
ence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus 
building a wall of separation between church and State.” Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145, 164 (1878).  
 6. “[T]he establishment clause of the First Amendment . . . is not violated, even if 
government grants aid, recognition, or support to religion or religious groups, as long as gov-
ernment gives equal aid, recognition, or support to all religions and parallel or similar secularly 
based systems of belief and their organized groups.” EQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A 
PLURALIST SOCIETY 1 (Stephen V. Monsma & J. Christopher Soper eds., 1998). 
 7. See GUY HAARSCHER, LA LAÏCITE 55–56 (1996). 
 8. Id. at 57–60. 
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with the queen at its head although no real advantages exist for the 
faithful of the dominant denomination.9 Finally, in Denmark, the 
Lutheran religion is the official practice,10 although freedom of con-
science and nondiscrimination are strictly guaranteed.11 Certainly no 
strict separation exists in these nations. 
France exemplifies a country evolving towards neutrality. Al-
though the French Church and the pope violently rejected the 1905 
statute at the beginning of the twentieth century, in 1946, after the 
Second World War, laïcité became a constitutional principle accepted 
by the Catholics.12 In fact, in 1958, the preamble of de Gaulle’s new 
constitution referred to the 1946 Constitution as well as to the 1789 
Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen. The newly installed 
Constitutional Court also became more powerful. It efficiently 
(though controversially) monitored the appropriateness of the stat-
utes voted for by the French Parliament for what is now called the 
Bloc de constitutionnalité.13 In 1905, laïcité was only a statutory prin-
ciple; today it is a well-protected constitutional standard. 
The law of separation imposed a specific organization on the ma-
jority religion in France, Catholicism—as well as on minority de-
nominations, such as Protestantism and Judaism. The law also privat-
ized the property of the Catholic Church. All churches had to adopt 
an organizational structure based on their municipality (associations 
cultuelles—associations pertaining to worship14). The resulting de-
centralized church structure posed no problem for Protestantism or 
Judaism, which are not hierarchically organized, but the Catholics 
contested the neutrality of such a policy on the basis that imposing a 
fragmentation on an essentially hierarchical body would dissolve and 
democratize its system of authority.15 The Catholic Church also chal-
lenged the alleged neutrality of privatizing property policy, claiming 
that huge masses of tourists and scholars frequented the cathedrals 
and monasteries, outnumbering the rapidly dwindling number of be-
lievers. Thus, by privatization, the non-Catholics illegitimately prof-
 
 9. Id. at 52–53. 
 10. The Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs is head of the church. 
 11. HAARSCHER, supra note 7, at 53. 
 12. Id. at 21. 
 13. The term was created by the French constitutionalist Louis Favoreu and refers to the 
combination of the 1946 and 1958 Constitutions as well as the 1789 Declaration. 
 14. See HAARSCHER, supra note 7, at 19. 
 15. The Pope himself vigorously intervened in the debate. 
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ited, in a certain sense, from cultural premises that were supposed to 
be kept up by the church. The problem was the same in both cases: 
separation seemed to be an excuse for interfering in the church’s ac-
tivity by imposing on it an alien organizational system as well as costs 
that would benefit the whole laos, not just the Catholics. 
The 1920s brought resolution of these problems. Associations 
diocésaines16 replaced associations cultuelles. Building associations 
took into account the Catholic Church’s organization and replaced 
the secular, revolutionary municipality (commune) with the diocese. 
The state accepted the responsibility of paying for the upkeep of the 
Catholic cultural sites insofar as they belonged to the culture, that is, 
to the whole laos. Little by little, reconciliation between the Catholic 
Church and the principle of laïcité took place. 
Private schools17 are an example of the compromise reached in 
France. The classical separatist position holds, “To public schools 
public funds, to private schools private funds.”18 However, in France, 
the country of laïcité, and the 1905 statute, only the most radical 
 
 16. Associations diocésaines were associations based on the diocese, that is, the sphere of 
competence of the bishop. HAARSCHER, supra note 7, at 20–21. 
 17. Id. at 30. 
 18. Remarkably, the United States, which accords much more importance to religion 
than does Europe (and particularly France), has adopted this laïcist position up to now. The 
recent debate about the “voucher system” in Cleveland, Ohio, allowing parents to send their 
children to public or private school with the help of public subsidies, bears testimony to the 
separatist conception that although controversial, is still dominant at least in the opinions of a 
simple majority of Supreme Court Justices. But the situation might change very rapidly, as ex-
pressed below: 
  On September 25, [2001,] the United States Supreme Court agreed to review 
the December 2000 ruling of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had found 
the Cleveland school voucher program unconstitutional because most of the partici-
pating schools were religiously affiliated. 
  In 1999, the Ohio Supreme Court declared the program constitutional be-
cause there was no credible evidence the program’s primary effect was to advance re-
ligion.  
  Specifically, the United States Supreme Court will review the following ques-
tion, with a ruling expected by summer 2002:  
  Does a program designed to rescue economically disadvantaged children from a 
failing public school system by providing scholarships that they may use in private, reli-
gious or suburban public schools that choose to participate in the program—and which 
operates in the context of a broad array of public school choices—violate the First 
Amendment because in the early stages of the program most of the schools that have 
agreed to take on scholarship students are religiously affiliated? 
George A. Clowes, U.S. Supreme Court Will Take on Cleveland Voucher Case, SCHOOL 
REFORM NEWS (2001), available at http://www.heartland.org/education/dec01/ 
Cleveland.htm. 
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current of the laïcist left adopted the position summarized in this 
motto. In fact, when François Mitterrand became president in 1981, 
the slogan was written into his program. But in 1984, when the 
French government tried to adopt the slogan, the opposition organ-
ized huge demonstrations in the name of liberty. Mitterrand soon 
realized the struggle was doomed to failure and dropped the slogan, 
leaving private schools today publicly subsidized.19  
Similar to the rationale for state funding to upkeep Catholic ca-
thedrals and architectural works of art, the alleged rationale for the 
apparent breach of the separation principle in funding private schools 
is based on culture. France has attempted to rationalize this incon-
gruity by distinguishing between the cultuel (pertaining to worship) 
and the culturel (pertaining to culture). Worship only concerns the 
group of people who freely choose a certain denomination; culture—
understood as the education of humanity, children, and adults—
concerns the whole citizenry. Catholic schools provide a cultural ser-
vice to the population independent of religious instruction and wor-
ship. Similarly, tourists and scholars visiting the churches enjoy a 
spiritual pleasure independent of the religious intention of the prem-
ises. 
The situation remains the same today. Although the 1905 statute 
is still good law, associations diocésaines and subsidization of both 
churches and schools for cultural purposes are widely accepted. Of 
course, this acceptance does not mean that France has totally aban-
doned separation for the sake of collaboration with churches. In-
deed, in some ways the associations diocésaines are more separatist 
than the former associations cultuelles. The latter clearly meant that 
the state intervened in order to impose its own values upon the 
Catholic Church, such as decentralization and democracy, whereas 
the former implies that the state leaves the church alone by allowing 
it to choose an organizational structure deduced from its own theol-
ogy. As long as the church obeys the law of the state, it may choose 
the form of administrative structure it thinks fit. However, in the 
area of schools, an institutionalized form of collaboration obviously 
exists. The state does not formally privilege the Catholic denomina-
tion. In fact, any church may create schools and commit itself, by 
contract with the state, to a generally imposed curriculum accepting 
the same obligations as the other churches. This model may appear 
 
 19. The huge majority of the subsidized schools are Catholic schools. 
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fair, but it is at best neutral. It is in no way separatist but rather col-
laborationist. If considered unfair, it might appear to advantage the 
Catholic Church, which runs the vast majority of the private schools 
in the French system. 
IV. THE SECOND INTERPRETATION OF SECULARIZATION 
Let us now consider the more fundamental reason why the 
Catholic Church in France has progressively accepted a principle 
(laïcité) that was considered devilish in 1905. The particular ele-
ments mentioned above, organization and culture, are only part of 
the answer. The main motive is more likely to be found in interna-
tional historical developments. As suggested above, for the Catholic 
Church (indeed, for all churches), laïcité is highly preferable to 
communist-style official atheism. In the nineteenth century, the state 
was not laïque in that it was biased in favor of Catholicism. But this 
bias tapered off in 1905 when religion was (very partially, as we have 
seen) relegated to the private sphere. At that time Republicans were 
often not only against the privilege of the Catholic Church in public 
affairs but also strongly antireligious; however the state was at least 
formally neutral. The nightmare for the Catholic Church was—and 
still is—a complete reversal of the positions that would not only de-
prive it of its former illegitimate privileges but also would put Catho-
lics in danger of persecution. Such a reversal might be called the 
“bad” secularization process. 
This second process of secularization differs from the first process 
as it asserts that only secular things are good, important, or valid and 
that “otherworldliness” is bad because it perverts normal relation-
ships between people in this world. An example of this type of secu-
larization is Marx’s notion of religion as the “opium of the peo-
ple.”20 He alleged that by making people fantasize about an 
 
 20. Marx stated: 
Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopedic compendium, its logic 
in popular form, its spiritual point d’honneur, it [sic] enthusiasm, its moral sanction, 
its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification. It is 
the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not ac-
quired any true reality. The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the 
struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion. Religious suffering is, 
at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real 
suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless 
world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people. The aboli-
tion of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real 
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otherworldly solution to their suffering, religion, like opium, pre-
vents them from seeing the world as it is and transfers the responsi-
bility for injustices such as political oppression and economic exploi-
tation from the real culprits—despots and capitalists—to the 
unchangeable order of the world.21 
Marx’s conception may be interpreted in three different ways. 
The first interpretation implies that religion is a false illusion. The 
second interpretation implies that this error, preventing religious fol-
lowers from seeing the world as it is, is a damaging illusion. Only the 
third interpretation, wherein the state deprives a church of its legiti-
mate privileges by abolishing religion itself, would be characteristic 
of bad secularization. The first two interpretations do not contradict 
the principle of laïcité, which is the good secularization process em-
bodying the idea that each person is entitled to think whatever he or 
she likes about spiritual matters, provided that that person does not 
try to impose his or her conception on others or claim any privilege 
related to that conception. In such a secular society based on laïcité, 
religiously-minded people might consider atheism a bad thing, for 
instance by arguing that without a belief in God, “everything would 
be permitted”22 and that atheism would unavoidably lead to relativ-
ism and even nihilism.23 Such contenders would allege that agnosti-
cism and atheism endanger respect for human rights and freedom of 
religion.24 But the reverse position is also a priori permitted. Under 
this view, a materialist or a rationalist may consider religion the 
“opium of the people,” hence deducing that a tolerant society would 
be better off without people who refer their values to a transcendent 
being and thus are intrinsically intolerant because they believe in un-
compromising absolute values. 
These opinions are usually present in democratic societies. How-
ever, a very damaging, although radically opposed, consequence 
 
happiness. 
Karl Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, in KARL MARX: EARLY 
WRITINGS 41–46 (T.B. Bottomore ed. & trans., 1963). 
 21. Id. As the prayer says, here below is “a valley of tears.” Id. The only possible salva-
tion is in the other world. Thus, under the second interpretation of secularization, religion 
works like a drug by distorting reality and slowing the pace of emancipation by weakening 
critical awareness of the exploited and the oppressed. 
 22. Ivan’s thesis is found in Dostoyevsky’s THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV. 
 23. “[N]othing is valid,” or, to rephrase it, “everything has the same [non-]value.” 
 24. In the eighteenth century, Locke believed that atheists could not be trusted because 
they could not swear on the Bible or invoke God. 
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must be carefully avoided. Each person should feel comfortable ex-
pressing his or her religious or nonreligious beliefs. In order for peo-
ple to cooperate and find common grounds, so they can be loyal to 
each other, they may believe that disagreements should not be ex-
pressed. This desire results in what I would call the “lowest common 
denominator policy”—do not mention problems or positions that 
involve strong disagreements. Today, such a policy is labelled “po-
litical correctness.” To adopt a correct political behavior and to abide 
by the rules of a pluralist state (based on freedom of conscience, not 
religious orthodoxy), one should not shock others. Therefore, re-
specting one another’s creeds and values means not saying anything 
that might disturb them. Progressively, the debate would become 
dominated by an attitude of prudence (and, one might argue, hypoc-
risy). 
As discussed earlier, the process of secularization in France began 
about twenty years before the 1905 statute on the separation of 
church and state. Laïcité was first introduced in the public schools 
before becoming the law of the adults. Around 1885, Jules Ferry, 
then the French Minister of Education expelled religious instruction 
from the primary public schools and replaced it with morale laïque.25 
The idea was, at least in general, quite clear: instead of teaching val-
ues and attitudes valid only for Catholic pupils, the public school 
would teach moral norms of behavior supposedly valid for every 
French citizen. The most difficult question then became what the 
subject matter of such instruction should be. Two positions were 
important. Ferry’s position held that primary school teachers should 
carefully avoid any statement that might shock the parents of any 
pupil in the class.26 Ferdinand Buisson, also a well-known laïque ac-
 
 25. “Secularist ethics” is an approximate translation of this very French expression. 
 26. He even suggested that instructors imagine that all the parents were sitting in their 
class, not wanting to be disturbed by any word that might challenge any of their religious ten-
ets:  
At the moment when you intend to present to your pupils a precept or any maxim, 
ask yourselves if, as far as you know, there is at least one honest man who might be 
shocked by what you will say. Ask yourselves if even one head of family (I insist: 
even one), who would be sitting in your class, might in good faith refuse his agree-
ment to what he would be hearing to. If yes, refrain from telling it, if not, speak 
boldly because what you will be communicating to the child is not your own wis-
dom but the wisdom of the human species. . . . The teacher will have to avoid as a 
bad deed whatever would, in his speech or his attitude, hurt the religious beliefs of 
the children put into his care, whatever would trouble their mind or reveal on his 
part a lack of respect or reserve towards any opinion. 
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tivist27 at that time, adopted the opposite position. For him the only 
alternatives to education were clerical and rationalist schools. In his 
view, the “new thought,” which consisted of reason, free thinking, 
and free examination without resort to any supernatural entity would 
replace the expelled religious instruction. Of course, such an attitude 
was intolerable not only to Catholics but also to many liberal nonbe-
lievers who thought that it would amount to imposing an official ra-
tionalist and antireligious ideology on young people. 
Both alternatives are in one way or another unacceptable. Either 
the controversy about God would be suppressed for the sake of a 
deleterious, superficial consensus or it would be suppressed by im-
posing one of the alternative positions on children (who would be 
future adult citizens). Jules Ferry won the debate and controversial 
religious opinions would not be mentioned in class. If Buisson had 
prevailed, the path would have been cleared for an official antireligi-
ous process of secularization favored by the most radical laïcist activ-
ists. 
An important difference exists, however, between teaching anti-
religious doctrines at school and suppressing religion or persecuting 
believers.28 An official atheist policy would only mean a reversal of 
traditional positions. In European history, nonreligious people29 
were persecuted because they did not accept the official conception 
of the Truth, which was backed by the “bras séculier”30 of the state. 
Conversely, believers were persecuted during the Stalinist era of the 
former Soviet Union because the official “Truth” was that religion 
was a damaging illusion. A fundamental difference exists between a 
state that does not intervene in religious matters and treats people 
independently of their spiritual affiliations and a state that imposes an 
official ideology, be it religious or not. The first kind of political au-
thority is secular in the sense that the state does not meddle in the 
 
JULES FERRY, La lettre de Jules Ferry aux instituteurs (27 Novembre 1883), in POUVOIRS: 
REVUE FRANÇAISE D’ETUDES CONSTITUTIONNELLES ET POLITIQUES 109–16 (1995). 
 27. Buisson was a complex character who always opposed clericalism. But when, in the 
beginning of the twentieth century, free thinkers interpreted the principle of “laïcité” in an 
antireligious sense, he attacked the imposition under the pretext of rationalism. See JEAN-
MARIE MAYEUR, LA QUESTION LAÏQUE. XIXE–XXE SIECLE 82 (1997). 
 28. Although persecution of believers occurred in twentieth century Communist coun-
tries, such persecution has not occurred in France. 
 29. “Nonreligious” in this context means people who adopt any different religion, 
including Christians with other rites and sacraments. 
 30. Bras séculier is defined as the “secular arm.” 
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“other world” sphere, or the ultimate ends of life, which are strictly 
matters of conscience and freedom. The state, in this first case, is 
secular because it only deals with terrestrial matters by overseeing the 
problems that a community of free citizens encounters such as indi-
vidual rights, public facilities, and social security rather than the con-
tent of the faith or the belief. In the second instance, the state is also 
secular because people in power are convinced that no otherworldli-
ness exists; therefore, they believe they are entitled by history to 
eradicate damaging illusions by repressing religious activities. 
History reveals that both meanings were often intermingled in 
the mind of activists, politicians, and writers. In France, the Catholic 
Church’s domination of political and social life had been so para-
mount that getting rid of it was considered by many people as an 
antireligious struggle. But philosophically and pedagogically speak-
ing, the two forms of struggle are radically different. The first secular 
state is laïque in the sense that it works in the service of the whole 
laos (people), not just part of it. The second secular state can in no 
possible context be interpreted as laïque: it imposes atheism in place 
of an official religion, resulting in favoritism (by the utmost repres-
sive means) for that part of the population that criticizes religion or, 
more often, obeys out of fear or sheer self-interest. 
V. SECULARIZATION AND THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11 
After the attacks on New York and Washington on September 
11, 2001, Osama Bin Laden justified his actions by criticizing the 
United States policy in Israel, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Regardless of 
the absolute unacceptable character of the attacks, the West could 
certainly envisage a more balanced attitude towards the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, a solution to the Iraqi crisis,31 and the departure 
of United States military from Saudi Arabia.32 
However, there remains a cultural or theological struggle to be 
taken into account in the fight against terrorism, and it would at 
least theoretically be possible to “moderate” and rationalize some 
aims by listening (even with a critical ear) to the claims (however dis-
torted) that surface in the Arab-Muslim street. Of course these mod-
erate (although controversial) aims can be discussed with Muslims 
 
 31. A beginning to this solution would be to stop the embargo. 
 32. The proximity of military camps to Mecca and Medina are considered humiliating 
for the Muslims. 
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who might be seduced by the Al-Qaeda rhetoric but not with the 
terrorists themselves. Bin Laden wants to eradicate the Jewish pres-
ence in the Middle East and retain the division between the two na-
tionalisms. He does not blame Saddam Hussein for the situation in 
Iraq but only the United States, and when asking for the retreat of 
the American forces from Saudi Arabia, he does not think of freedom 
of conscience (respecting the sacred places and the religious practices 
of all the people in the world) but of a Muslim soil that must be pu-
rified from any alien presence. 
Such an intellectual strategy cannot coexist with the idea of 
eliminating secularism. It is certain that when Bin Laden uses the lat-
ter term, he gives it the “bad” meaning as defined above. For him, 
the struggle takes place between believers of the true faith and infi-
dels. In order to make what he considers to be the will of God pre-
vail, he is ready to sacrifice thousands of innocent lives. Undoubt-
edly, for him the struggle against secularism means imposing his 
fanatic view of Islam on the world. In such a context, the protests 
against the American (“Christian”) military presence in the vicinity 
of the Holy Places is not a matter of mutual respect, but of eliminat-
ing any form of pluralism. Bin Laden is of course against the “bad” 
form of secularism (he began his fight, with the help of the United 
States, against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s) but 
he is also—and maybe more importantly—against the “good” one, 
that encompasses “laïcité” and freedom of conscience. It will be very 
difficult to explain in the Muslim world that the form of secularism 
that Western democracies struggle for does not amount to an anti-
religious stance but is dedicated to permitting everyone the free ex-
ercise of religion or, more generally, the free commitment to any 
spiritual conception that respects the same right for others. Indeed, 
accusing America of being antireligious is probably still more unjust 
than attacking Europe on the same topic. As previously mentioned, 
the United States was built on the premise that no established relig-
ion should remind people of European persecution whereas in many 
European countries, the secular state had to struggle against a domi-
nant religion, which unavoidably created antireligious feelings in the 
population. But it remains that in democratic countries, the secular 
state works in the service of freedom and attacking this form of secu-
larism would mean a terrible regression to a form of fanatical intoler-
ance that is not easily captured by the benign expression “established 
religion.” 
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